CTF Reverse Engineering
Quick reference for RE challenges. For detailed techniques, see supporting files.
Additional Resources
- •tools.md - Tool-specific commands (GDB, Ghidra, radare2, IDA)
- •patterns.md - Common patterns, VMs, obfuscation, anti-debugging
Problem-Solving Workflow
- •Start with strings extraction - many easy challenges have plaintext flags
- •Try ltrace/strace - dynamic analysis often reveals flags without reversing
- •Map control flow before modifying execution
- •Automate manual processes via scripting (r2pipe, Python)
- •Validate assumptions by comparing decompiler outputs
Quick Wins (Try First!)
# Plaintext flag extraction
strings binary | grep -E "flag\{|CTF\{|pico"
strings binary | grep -iE "flag|secret|password"
rabin2 -z binary | grep -i "flag"
# Dynamic analysis - often captures flag directly
ltrace ./binary
strace -f -s 500 ./binary
# Hex dump search
xxd binary | grep -i flag
# Run with test inputs
./binary AAAA
echo "test" | ./binary
Initial Analysis
file binary # Type, architecture checksec --file=binary # Security features (for pwn) chmod +x binary # Make executable
Memory Dumping Strategy
Key insight: Let the program compute the answer, then dump it.
gdb ./binary start b *main+0x198 # Break at final comparison run # Enter any input of correct length x/s $rsi # Dump computed flag x/38c $rsi # As characters
Decoy Flag Detection
Pattern: Multiple fake targets before real check.
Identification:
- •Look for multiple comparison targets in sequence
- •Check for different success messages
- •Trace which comparison is checked LAST
Solution: Set breakpoint at FINAL comparison, not earlier ones.
GDB PIE Debugging
PIE binaries randomize base address. Use relative breakpoints:
gdb ./binary start # Forces PIE base resolution b *main+0xca # Relative to main run
Comparison Direction (Critical!)
Two patterns:
- •
transform(flag) == stored_target- Reverse the transform - •
transform(stored_target) == flag- Flag IS the transformed data!
Pattern 2 solution: Don't reverse - just apply transform to stored target.
Common Encryption Patterns
- •XOR with single byte - try all 256 values
- •XOR with known plaintext (
flag{,CTF{) - •RC4 with hardcoded key
- •Custom permutation + XOR
- •XOR with position index (
^ ior^ (i & 0xff)) layered with a repeating key
Quick Tool Reference
# Radare2 r2 -d ./binary # Debug mode aaa # Analyze afl # List functions pdf @ main # Disassemble main # Ghidra (headless) analyzeHeadless project/ tmp -import binary -postScript script.py # IDA ida64 binary # Open in IDA64
Binary Types
Python .pyc
import marshal, dis
with open('file.pyc', 'rb') as f:
f.read(16) # Skip header
code = marshal.load(f)
dis.dis(code)
WASM
wasm2c checker.wasm -o checker.c gcc -O3 checker.c wasm-rt-impl.c -o checker
Android APK
apktool d app.apk -o decoded/ # Best - decodes resources jadx app.apk # Decompile to Java grep -r "flag" decoded/res/values/strings.xml
.NET
- •dnSpy - debugging + decompilation
- •ILSpy - decompiler
Packed (UPX)
upx -d packed -o unpacked
Anti-Debugging Bypass
Common checks:
- •
IsDebuggerPresent()(Windows) - •
ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME)(Linux) - •
/proc/self/statusTracerPid - •Timing checks
Bypass: Set breakpoint at check, modify register to bypass conditional.
S-Box / Keystream Patterns
Xorshift32: Shifts 13, 17, 5
Xorshift64: Shifts 12, 25, 27
Magic constants: 0x2545f4914f6cdd1d, 0x9e3779b97f4a7c15
Custom VM Analysis
- •Identify structure: registers, memory, IP
- •Reverse
executeInsfor opcode meanings - •Write disassembler mapping opcodes to mnemonics
- •Often easier to bruteforce than fully reverse
- •Look for the bytecode file loaded via command-line arg
VM challenge workflow (C'est La V(M)ie):
# 1. Find entry point: entry() → __libc_start_main(FUN_xxx, ...) # 2. Identify loader function (reads .bin file into global buffer) # 3. Find executor with giant switch statement (opcode dispatch) # 4. Map each case to instruction: MOVI, ADD, XOR, CMP, JZ, READ, PRINT, HLT... # 5. Write disassembler, annotate output # 6. Identify flag transform (often reversible byte-by-byte)
Common VM opcodes to look for:
| Pattern in decompiler | Likely instruction |
|---|---|
global[param1] = param2 | MOVI (move immediate) |
global[p1] = global[p2] | MOVR (move register) |
global[p1] ^= global[p2] | XOR |
global[p1] op global[p2]; set flag | CMP |
if (flag) IP = param | JZ/JNZ |
read(stdin, &global[p1], 1) | READ |
write(stdout, &global[p1], 1) |
Python Bytecode Reversing
Pattern (Slithering Bytes): Given dis.dis() output of a flag checker.
Key instructions:
- •
LOAD_GLOBAL/LOAD_FAST— push name/variable onto stack - •
CALL N— pop function + N args, call, push result - •
BINARY_SUBSCR— pop index and sequence, pushseq[idx] - •
COMPARE_OP— pop two values, compare (55=!=, 40===) - •
POP_JUMP_IF_TRUE/FALSE— conditional branch
Reversing XOR flag checkers:
# Pattern: ord(flag[i]) ^ KEY == EXPECTED[i]
# Reverse: chr(EXPECTED[i] ^ KEY) for each position
# Interleaved tables (odd/even indices):
odd_table = [...] # Values for indices 1, 3, 5, ...
even_table = [...] # Values for indices 0, 2, 4, ...
flag = [''] * 30
for i, val in enumerate(even_table):
flag[i*2] = chr(val ^ key_even)
for i, val in enumerate(odd_table):
flag[i*2+1] = chr(val ^ key_odd)
Signal-Based Binary Exploration
Pattern (Signal Signal Little Star): Binary uses UNIX signals as a binary tree navigation mechanism.
Identification:
- •Multiple
sigaction()calls withSA_SIGINFO - •
sigaltstack()setup (alternate signal stack) - •Handler decodes embedded payload, installs next pair of signals
- •Two types: Node (installs children) vs Leaf (prints message + exits)
Solving approach:
- •Hook
sigactionviaLD_PRELOADto log signal installations - •DFS through the binary tree by sending signals
- •At each stage, observe which 2 signals are installed
- •Send one, check if program exits (leaf) or installs 2 more (node)
- •If wrong leaf, backtrack and try sibling
// LD_PRELOAD interposer to log sigaction calls
int sigaction(int signum, const struct sigaction *act, ...) {
if (act && (act->sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO))
log("SET %d SA_SIGINFO=1\n", signum);
return real_sigaction(signum, act, oldact);
}
Malware Anti-Analysis Bypass via Patching
Pattern (Carrot): Malware with multiple environment checks before executing payload.
Common checks to patch:
| Check | Technique | Patch |
|---|---|---|
ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME) | Anti-debug | Change cmp -1 to cmp 0 |
sleep(150) | Anti-sandbox timing | Change sleep value to 1 |
/proc/cpuinfo "hypervisor" | Anti-VM | Flip JNZ to JZ |
| "VMware"/"VirtualBox" strings | Anti-VM | Flip JNZ to JZ |
getpwuid username check | Environment | Flip comparison |
LD_PRELOAD check | Anti-hook | Skip check |
| Fan count / hardware check | Anti-VM | Flip JLE to JGE |
| Hostname check | Environment | Flip JNZ to JZ |
Ghidra patching workflow:
- •Find check function, identify the conditional jump
- •Click on instruction →
Ctrl+Shift+G→ modify opcode - •For
JNZ(0x75) →JZ(0x74), or vice versa - •For immediate values: change operand bytes directly
- •Export: press
O→ choose "Original File" format - •
chmod +xthe patched binary
Server-side validation bypass:
- •If patched binary sends system info to remote server, patch the data too
- •Modify string addresses in data-gathering functions
- •Change format strings to embed correct values directly
Expected Values Tables
Locating:
objdump -s -j .rodata binary | less # Look near comparison instructions # Size matches flag length
x86-64 Gotchas
Sign extension: 0xffffffc7 behaves differently in XOR vs addition
# For XOR: use low byte esi_xor = esi & 0xff # For addition: use full value with overflow result = (r13 + esi) & 0xffffffff
Iterative Solver Pattern
for pos in range(flag_length):
for c in range(256):
computed = compute_output(c, current_state)
if computed == EXPECTED[pos]:
flag.append(c)
update_state(c, computed)
break
Uniform transform shortcut: if changing one input byte only changes one output byte, build a 0..255 mapping by repeating a single byte across the whole input, then invert.
Unicorn Emulation (Complex State)
from unicorn import * from unicorn.x86_const import * mu = Uc(UC_ARCH_X86, UC_MODE_64) # Map segments, set up stack # Hook to trace register changes mu.emu_start(start_addr, end_addr)
Mixed-mode pitfall: if a 64-bit stub jumps into 32-bit code via retf/retfq, you must
switch to a UC_MODE_32 emulator and copy GPRs, EFLAGS, and XMM regs; missing XMM state
will corrupt SSE-based transforms.
Multi-Stage Shellcode Loaders
Pattern (I Heard You Liked Loaders): Nested shellcode with XOR decode loops and anti-debug.
Debugging workflow:
- •Break at
call raxin launcher, step into shellcode - •Bypass ptrace anti-debug: step to syscall,
set $rax=0 - •Step through XOR decode loop (or break on
int3if hidden) - •Repeat for each stage until final payload
Flag extraction from mov instructions:
# Final stage loads flag 4 bytes at a time via mov ebx, value # Extract little-endian 4-byte chunks values = [0x6174654d, 0x7b465443, ...] # From disassembly flag = b''.join(v.to_bytes(4, 'little') for v in values)
Timing Side-Channel Attack
Pattern (Clock Out): Validation time varies per correct character (longer sleep on match).
Exploitation:
import time
from pwn import *
flag = ""
for pos in range(flag_length):
best_char, best_time = '', 0
for c in string.printable:
io = remote(host, port)
start = time.time()
io.sendline((flag + c).ljust(total_len, 'X'))
io.recvall()
elapsed = time.time() - start
if elapsed > best_time:
best_time = elapsed
best_char = c
io.close()
flag += best_char
Godot Game Asset Extraction
Pattern (Steal the Xmas): Encrypted Godot .pck packages.
Tools:
Workflow:
- •Run KeyDot against game executable → extract encryption key
- •Input key into gdsdecomp
- •Extract and open project in Godot editor
- •Search scripts/resources for flag data
Unstripped Binary Information Leaks
Pattern (Bad Opsec): Debug info and file paths leak author identity.
Quick checks:
strings binary | grep "/home/" # Home directory paths strings binary | grep "/Users/" # macOS paths file binary # Check if stripped readelf -S binary | grep debug # Debug sections present?
Custom Mangle Function Reversing
Pattern (Flag Appraisal): Binary mangles input 2 bytes at a time with intermediate state, compares to static target.
Approach:
- •Extract static target bytes from
.rodatasection - •Understand mangle: processes pairs with running state value
- •Write inverse function (process in reverse, undo each operation)
- •Feed target bytes through inverse → recovers flag
Hex-Encoded String Comparison
Pattern (Spider's Curse): Input converted to hex, compared against hex constant.
Quick solve: Extract hex constant from strings/Ghidra, decode:
echo "4d65746143..." | xxd -r -p