Security audit patterns for Convex applications covering authentication, authorization, input validation, and Convex-specific vulnerabilities.

</overview> <rules>

The #1 Vibecoding Mistake: Unauthenticated Functions

Convex functions are public by default. Every query and mutation is callable from any client unless you add auth checks.

typescript

// CRITICAL: Anyone can read all users - MUST NOT do this
export const listUsers = query({
  handler: async (ctx) => {
    return await ctx.db.query("users").collect();
  },
});

// CRITICAL: Anyone can delete any document - MUST NOT do this
export const deleteNote = mutation({
  args: { noteId: v.id("notes") },
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    await ctx.db.delete(args.noteId);
  },
});

// SECURE: MUST check auth first
export const listUsers = query({
  handler: async (ctx) => {
    const userId = await getAuthUserId(ctx);
    if (!userId) throw new Error("Unauthenticated");
    // Now safe to return data
    return await ctx.db.query("users").collect();
  },
});

All queries and mutations MUST check authentication unless intentionally public.

Authentication Checks

Using Convex Auth

typescript

import { getAuthUserId } from "@convex-dev/auth/server";

// No auth check - MUST NOT do this
export const getMyProfile = query({
  handler: async (ctx) => {
    // Who is "my"? Anyone can call this!
    return await ctx.db.query("users").first();
  },
});

// MUST get authenticated user
export const getMyProfile = query({
  handler: async (ctx) => {
    const userId = await getAuthUserId(ctx);
    if (!userId) throw new Error("Unauthenticated");
    return await ctx.db.get(userId);
  },
});

Using Third-Party Auth (Clerk, Auth0)

typescript

// Just checking ctx.auth exists - WRONG
export const sensitiveData = query({
  handler: async (ctx) => {
    const identity = await ctx.auth.getUserIdentity();
    // identity could be null!
    return await ctx.db.query("secrets").collect();
  },
});

// MUST properly validate identity
export const sensitiveData = query({
  handler: async (ctx) => {
    const identity = await ctx.auth.getUserIdentity();
    if (!identity) throw new Error("Unauthenticated");
    // Now identity.tokenIdentifier is available
    return await ctx.db.query("secrets")
      .filter(q => q.eq(q.field("userId"), identity.subject))
      .collect();
  },
});

</rules> <vulnerabilities>

Authorization: The IDOR Problem

Authentication (who you are) ≠ Authorization (what you can access).

typescript

// HIGH: IDOR - Any logged-in user can read any note - MUST NOT do this
export const getNote = query({
  args: { noteId: v.id("notes") },
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    const userId = await getAuthUserId(ctx);
    if (!userId) throw new Error("Unauthenticated");
    // Authenticated but no ownership check!
    return await ctx.db.get(args.noteId);
  },
});

// MUST check ownership
export const getNote = query({
  args: { noteId: v.id("notes") },
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    const userId = await getAuthUserId(ctx);
    if (!userId) throw new Error("Unauthenticated");
    
    const note = await ctx.db.get(args.noteId);
    if (!note || note.userId !== userId) {
      throw new Error("Not found"); // MUST NOT reveal existence
    }
    return note;
  },
});

Team/Org Membership Checks

typescript

// Trusts client-provided teamId - MUST NOT do this
export const getTeamData = query({
  args: { teamId: v.id("teams") },
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    const userId = await getAuthUserId(ctx);
    if (!userId) throw new Error("Unauthenticated");
    // User says they're on this team - but are they?
    return await ctx.db.query("projects")
      .filter(q => q.eq(q.field("teamId"), args.teamId))
      .collect();
  },
});

// MUST verify membership
export const getTeamData = query({
  args: { teamId: v.id("teams") },
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    const userId = await getAuthUserId(ctx);
    if (!userId) throw new Error("Unauthenticated");
    
    const membership = await ctx.db.query("teamMembers")
      .withIndex("by_team_user", q => 
        q.eq("teamId", args.teamId).eq("userId", userId)
      ).first();
    
    if (!membership) throw new Error("Not a team member");
    
    return await ctx.db.query("projects")
      .filter(q => q.eq(q.field("teamId"), args.teamId))
      .collect();
  },
});

Custom Functions Pattern (Recommended)

SHOULD use convex-helpers to enforce auth by default:

typescript

// convex/functions.ts
import { customQuery, customMutation } from "convex-helpers/server/customFunctions";
import { getAuthUserId } from "@convex-dev/auth/server";

// All userQuery functions require authentication
export const userQuery = customQuery(query, {
  args: {},
  input: async (ctx) => {
    const userId = await getAuthUserId(ctx);
    if (!userId) throw new Error("Unauthenticated");
    const user = await ctx.db.get(userId);
    if (!user) throw new Error("User not found");
    return { ctx: { user }, args: {} };
  },
});

// Usage - ctx.user is guaranteed to exist
export const getMyNotes = userQuery({
  handler: async (ctx) => {
    return await ctx.db.query("notes")
      .filter(q => q.eq(q.field("userId"), ctx.user._id))
      .collect();
  },
});

Audit: MUST check if custom functions are used consistently. Search for raw query( and mutation( usage.

Input Validation

Missing Validators

typescript

// No validation - args is 'any' - MUST NOT do this
export const createNote = mutation({
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    await ctx.db.insert("notes", args); // Could insert anything!
  },
});

// MUST use strict validators
export const createNote = mutation({
  args: {
    title: v.string(),
    content: v.string(),
    isPublic: v.optional(v.boolean()),
  },
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    const userId = await getAuthUserId(ctx);
    if (!userId) throw new Error("Unauthenticated");
    await ctx.db.insert("notes", {
      ...args,
      userId, // Server sets this, not client
    });
  },
});

Trusting Client-Provided IDs for Ownership

typescript

// Client provides userId - can impersonate anyone - MUST NOT do this
export const createNote = mutation({
  args: {
    title: v.string(),
    userId: v.id("users"), // Client-controlled!
  },
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    await ctx.db.insert("notes", args);
  },
});

// MUST have server determine userId
export const createNote = mutation({
  args: { title: v.string() },
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    const userId = await getAuthUserId(ctx);
    if (!userId) throw new Error("Unauthenticated");
    await ctx.db.insert("notes", {
      title: args.title,
      userId, // From auth, not args
    });
  },
});

Internal Functions

typescript

// Sensitive logic in public mutation - MUST NOT do this
export const processPayment = mutation({
  args: { amount: v.number() },
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    // Anyone can call this!
    await chargeCard(args.amount);
  },
});

// MUST use internalMutation for sensitive operations
export const processPayment = internalMutation({
  args: { userId: v.id("users"), amount: v.number() },
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    // Only callable from other server functions
    await chargeCard(args.amount);
  },
});

// Public function validates then calls internal
export const purchaseItem = mutation({
  args: { itemId: v.id("items") },
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    const userId = await getAuthUserId(ctx);
    if (!userId) throw new Error("Unauthenticated");
    
    const item = await ctx.db.get(args.itemId);
    // Validate, then call internal
    await ctx.runMutation(internal.payments.processPayment, {
      userId,
      amount: item.price,
    });
  },
});

HTTP Actions

typescript

// No auth on HTTP endpoint - MUST NOT do this
export const webhook = httpAction(async (ctx, request) => {
  const body = await request.json();
  await ctx.runMutation(api.data.processWebhook, body);
  return new Response("OK");
});

// MUST verify webhook signature
export const webhook = httpAction(async (ctx, request) => {
  const signature = request.headers.get("x-webhook-signature");
  const body = await request.text();
  
  if (!verifySignature(body, signature, process.env.WEBHOOK_SECRET)) {
    return new Response("Unauthorized", { status: 401 });
  }
  
  await ctx.runMutation(api.data.processWebhook, JSON.parse(body));
  return new Response("OK");
});

Real-Time Subscription Leakage

typescript

// Subscription returns all messages (data leak) - MUST NOT do this
export const allMessages = query({
  handler: async (ctx) => {
    return await ctx.db.query("messages").collect();
  },
});

// MUST filter by user's access
export const myMessages = query({
  handler: async (ctx) => {
    const userId = await getAuthUserId(ctx);
    if (!userId) return []; // Or throw
    
    // Only messages user has access to
    const myChannels = await ctx.db.query("channelMembers")
      .filter(q => q.eq(q.field("userId"), userId))
      .collect();
    
    const channelIds = myChannels.map(m => m.channelId);
    return await ctx.db.query("messages")
      .filter(q => q.or(...channelIds.map(id => 
        q.eq(q.field("channelId"), id)
      )))
      .collect();
  },
});

Environment Variables

typescript

// Accessing env vars that don't exist (undefined behavior)
const apiKey = process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY;

// MUST use Convex environment variables properly
// Set via: npx convex env set STRIPE_SECRET_KEY sk_live_...
// Access in actions only (not queries/mutations for determinism)
export const callStripe = action({
  handler: async (ctx) => {
    const apiKey = process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY;
    if (!apiKey) throw new Error("STRIPE_SECRET_KEY not configured");
    // ...
  },
});

Environment variables are only available in actions, not queries/mutations.

</vulnerabilities>

<severity_table>

Common Vulnerabilities Summary

Issue	Where to Look	Severity
No auth check in query/mutation	All `query({` and `mutation({`	CRITICAL
IDOR (no ownership check)	Functions with document IDs in args	HIGH
Client-provided userId	Args with `v.id("users")`	HIGH
Missing validators	Functions without `args: {}`	HIGH
Public function for internal logic	Sensitive business logic	HIGH
HTTP action without auth	`httpAction(`	HIGH
Subscription data leak	Queries returning collections	MEDIUM
Raw query/mutation (no custom fn)	Not using userQuery/userMutation	MEDIUM

</severity_table>

Quick Audit Commands

bash

# Find all public queries and mutations
rg "export const .* = query\(" convex/
rg "export const .* = mutation\(" convex/

# Find functions without auth checks
rg -l "export const .* = (query|mutation)\(" convex/ | \
  xargs rg -L "(getAuthUserId|getUserIdentity)"

# Find client-provided userId (potential IDOR)
rg 'userId: v\.id\("users"\)' convex/

# Find functions without validators
rg "handler: async \(ctx\)" convex/ -g "*.ts"

# Find HTTP actions
rg "httpAction" convex/

# Find internal vs public function usage
rg "internalMutation|internalQuery|internalAction" convex/

</commands> <checklist>

Hardening Checklist

• All queries/mutations MUST have auth checks (or use custom functions)
• Document access MUST include ownership/membership verification
• userId MUST come from auth context, not client args
• All functions MUST have proper validators
• Sensitive operations MUST use internalMutation/internalAction
• HTTP actions MUST verify signatures/tokens
• Real-time subscriptions MUST filter by user access
• Custom functions (userQuery/userMutation) SHOULD be used consistently
• ESLint rules SHOULD prevent importing raw query/mutation

</checklist>