# Install
pip install semgrep
# or
brew install semgrep

# Run with default security rules
semgrep --config=auto .

# Run specific rule packs
semgrep --config=p/security-audit .
semgrep --config=p/owasp-top-ten .
semgrep --config=p/cwe-top-25 .

# Run with custom rules
semgrep --config=./rules/ .

# Output formats
semgrep --config=auto --json -o results.json .
semgrep --config=auto --sarif -o results.sarif .

# Comprehensive security scanning
semgrep --config=p/security-audit \
        --config=p/secrets \
        --config=p/supply-chain \
        --config=p/default .

# Language-specific
semgrep --config=p/python .
semgrep --config=p/javascript .
semgrep --config=p/java .
semgrep --config=p/golang .

# Framework-specific
semgrep --config=p/django .
semgrep --config=p/flask .
semgrep --config=p/react .
semgrep --config=p/nodejs .

# Basic pattern matching
rules:
  - id: hardcoded-password
    pattern: password = "..."
    message: Hardcoded password detected
    languages: [python]
    severity: ERROR
    metadata:
      cwe: "CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials"
      owasp: "A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures"

  # Using metavariables
  - id: sql-injection-format-string
    patterns:
      - pattern: |
          $QUERY = f"...{$USER_INPUT}..."
          $CURSOR.execute($QUERY)
      - pattern: |
          $CURSOR.execute(f"...{$USER_INPUT}...")
    message: SQL injection via f-string
    languages: [python]
    severity: ERROR

  # Pattern with focus
  - id: dangerous-subprocess
    patterns:
      - pattern: subprocess.$METHOD(..., shell=True, ...)
      - metavariable-pattern:
          metavariable: $METHOD
          pattern-either:
            - pattern: run
            - pattern: call
            - pattern: Popen
    message: Subprocess with shell=True is dangerous
    languages: [python]
    severity: WARNING

  # Taint tracking (requires Semgrep Pro for full taint)
  - id: xss-vulnerability
    mode: taint
    pattern-sources:
      - pattern: request.args.get(...)
      - pattern: request.form.get(...)
    pattern-sinks:
      - pattern: render_template_string(...)
      - pattern: Markup(...)
    message: User input flows to unsafe output
    languages: [python]
    severity: ERROR

rules:
  # Pattern negation - exclude safe patterns
  - id: unsafe-deserialization
    patterns:
      - pattern: pickle_module.loads($DATA)
      - pattern-not-inside: |
          if validate_signature($DATA):
              ...
    message: Unsafe deserialization without validation
    languages: [python]
    severity: ERROR

  # Metavariable comparison
  - id: timing-attack-comparison
    patterns:
      - pattern: $SECRET == $USER_INPUT
      - metavariable-pattern:
          metavariable: $SECRET
          patterns:
            - pattern-either:
                - pattern: password
                - pattern: token
                - pattern: api_key
    message: Use constant-time comparison for secrets
    languages: [python]
    severity: WARNING
    fix: hmac.compare_digest($SECRET, $USER_INPUT)

  # Multiple pattern conjunction
  - id: jwt-none-algorithm
    patterns:
      - pattern-either:
          - pattern: jwt.decode($TOKEN, ..., algorithms=["none"], ...)
          - pattern: jwt.decode($TOKEN, ..., options={"verify_signature": False}, ...)
    message: JWT verification disabled
    languages: [python]
    severity: ERROR

  # Regex-based detection
  - id: aws-access-key
    pattern-regex: 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}'
    message: AWS Access Key ID detected
    languages: [generic]
    severity: ERROR

  # Cross-file analysis
  - id: flask-debug-production
    patterns:
      - pattern-inside: |
          if __name__ == "__main__":
              ...
      - pattern: app.run(..., debug=True, ...)
    paths:
      include:
        - "**/*prod*.py"
        - "**/production/**"
    message: Debug mode enabled in production file
    languages: [python]
    severity: ERROR

# Install CodeQL CLI
# Download from https://github.com/github/codeql-cli-binaries

# Create database
codeql database create ./codeql-db --language=python --source-root=./src

# Run security queries
codeql database analyze ./codeql-db \
  codeql/python-queries:codeql-suites/python-security-extended.qls \
  --format=sarif-latest \
  --output=results.sarif

# Run specific query
codeql database analyze ./codeql-db \
  ./custom-queries/sql-injection.ql \
  --format=csv \
  --output=results.csv

/**
 * @name SQL Injection
 * @description User input flows to SQL query without sanitization
 * @kind path-problem
 * @problem.severity error
 * @security-severity 9.8
 * @id py/sql-injection
 * @tags security
 *       external/cwe/cwe-089
 */

import python
import semmle.python.security.dataflow.SqlInjection
import DataFlow::PathGraph

from SqlInjection::Configuration config, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
where config.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "SQL injection from $@.", source.getNode(), "user input"

/**
 * @name Hardcoded credentials
 * @kind problem
 * @problem.severity warning
 * @id py/hardcoded-credentials
 */

import python

from Assignment a, StringLiteral s
where
  a.getValue() = s and
  a.getTarget().(Name).getId().regexpMatch("(?i).*(password|secret|key|token|credential).*") and
  s.getText().length() > 5
select a, "Potential hardcoded credential in variable: " + a.getTarget().(Name).getId()

/**
 * @name Command injection
 * @kind path-problem
 */

import python
import semmle.python.dataflow.new.TaintTracking
import semmle.python.ApiGraphs

class CommandInjectionConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
  CommandInjectionConfig() { this = "CommandInjectionConfig" }

  override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
    // Flask request inputs
    source = API::moduleImport("flask").getMember("request").getMember(_).getACall()
  }

  override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
    // subprocess calls
    exists(DataFlow::CallCfgNode call |
      call = API::moduleImport("subprocess").getMember(_).getACall() and
      sink = call.getArg(0)
    )
    or
    // os.system
    exists(DataFlow::CallCfgNode call |
      call = API::moduleImport("os").getMember("system").getACall() and
      sink = call.getArg(0)
    )
  }

  override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
    // shlex.quote sanitizes command injection
    node = API::moduleImport("shlex").getMember("quote").getACall()
  }
}

# Install
pip install bandit

# Basic scan
bandit -r ./src

# With severity filtering
bandit -r ./src -ll  # Medium and above
bandit -r ./src -lll # High only

# Specific tests
bandit -r ./src -t B301,B302,B303  # Specific checks
bandit -r ./src -s B101            # Skip assert check

# Output formats
bandit -r ./src -f json -o bandit-results.json
bandit -r ./src -f sarif -o bandit-results.sarif

# Configuration file
bandit -r ./src -c bandit.yaml

# bandit.yaml
skips: ['B101']  # Skip assert_used
tests: ['B301', 'B302', 'B303', 'B304', 'B305', 'B306', 'B307', 'B308', 'B309', 'B310', 'B311', 'B312', 'B313', 'B314', 'B315', 'B316', 'B317', 'B318', 'B319', 'B320', 'B321', 'B322', 'B323', 'B324', 'B325']
exclude_dirs: ['tests', 'venv']

# Install
go install github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/gosec@latest

# Basic scan
gosec ./...

# With severity filtering
gosec -severity medium ./...

# Specific rules
gosec -include=G101,G102,G103 ./...
gosec -exclude=G104 ./...

# Output formats
gosec -fmt=json -out=results.json ./...
gosec -fmt=sarif -out=results.sarif ./...

# Install
npm install --save-dev eslint eslint-plugin-security eslint-plugin-no-unsanitized

# Run
npx eslint --ext .js,.ts ./src

// .eslintrc.json
{
  "plugins": ["security", "no-unsanitized"],
  "extends": ["plugin:security/recommended-legacy"],
  "rules": {
    "security/detect-object-injection": "error",
    "security/detect-non-literal-require": "error",
    "security/detect-non-literal-fs-filename": "error",
    "security/detect-eval-with-expression": "error",
    "security/detect-child-process": "warn",
    "no-unsanitized/method": "error",
    "no-unsanitized/property": "error"
  }
}

<!-- pom.xml -->
<plugin>
  <groupId>com.github.spotbugs</groupId>
  <artifactId>spotbugs-maven-plugin</artifactId>
  <version>4.8.2.0</version>
  <configuration>
    <plugins>
      <plugin>
        <groupId>com.h3xstream.findsecbugs</groupId>
        <artifactId>findsecbugs-plugin</artifactId>
        <version>1.13.0</version>
      </plugin>
    </plugins>
    <effort>Max</effort>
    <threshold>Low</threshold>
  </configuration>
</plugin>

# Run
mvn spotbugs:check

# Generate report
mvn spotbugs:spotbugs

## Triage Priority Matrix

| Severity | Exploitability | Data Sensitivity | Priority |
|----------|---------------|------------------|----------|
| Critical | Easy | High | P0 - Immediate |
| High | Easy | Medium | P1 - This sprint |
| High | Difficult | High | P1 - This sprint |
| Medium | Easy | Low | P2 - Next sprint |
| Medium | Difficult | Medium | P2 - Next sprint |
| Low | Any | Any | P3 - Backlog |

## Common False Positive Patterns

### SQL Injection FPs
- Parameterized queries flagged incorrectly
- ORM methods (SQLAlchemy, Django ORM)
- Constant/hardcoded queries
- Query builders with proper escaping

### XSS FPs
- Auto-escaping template engines (Jinja2 with autoescape)
- React/Vue automatic escaping
- Server-side only code paths
- Sanitization libraries in use

### Command Injection FPs
- Hardcoded command arguments
- Validated/allowlisted inputs
- Proper escaping with shlex.quote

### Crypto FPs
- Test/development environments
- Non-sensitive data encryption
- Legacy code marked for migration

## Triage Process

1. **Is it reachable?**
   - Dead code? → FP
   - Test code only? → Low priority
   - Production path? → Continue

2. **Is user input involved?**
   - Hardcoded values only? → FP
   - Internal-only data? → Reduce severity
   - User-controlled? → Continue

3. **Are there mitigations?**
   - Sanitization present? → Verify effectiveness
   - WAF protection? → Defense-in-depth
   - Authentication required? → Reduce severity

4. **What's the impact?**
   - RCE possible? → Critical
   - Data breach? → High
   - DoS only? → Medium
   - Information disclosure? → Context-dependent

#!/bin/bash
# sast_scan.sh - Orchestrate multiple SAST tools

PROJECT_DIR="${1:-.}"
OUTPUT_DIR="${2:-./sast-results}"
mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR"

echo "[*] Starting SAST scan orchestration..."

# Run tools in parallel
(
  echo "[*] Running Semgrep..."
  semgrep --config=auto "$PROJECT_DIR" --json -o "$OUTPUT_DIR/semgrep.json" 2>/dev/null
  echo "[+] Semgrep complete"
) &

(
  echo "[*] Running Bandit..."
  bandit -r "$PROJECT_DIR" -f json -o "$OUTPUT_DIR/bandit.json" 2>/dev/null
  echo "[+] Bandit complete"
) &

(
  echo "[*] Running gitleaks..."
  gitleaks detect --source="$PROJECT_DIR" --report-path="$OUTPUT_DIR/gitleaks.json" --report-format=json 2>/dev/null
  echo "[+] Gitleaks complete"
) &

# Wait for all tools
wait

echo "[+] All scans complete. Results in $OUTPUT_DIR"

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Aggregate SAST results from multiple tools."""

import json
from pathlib import Path
from collections import defaultdict

def load_semgrep(path):
    """Parse Semgrep JSON output."""
    findings = []
    with open(path) as f:
        data = json.load(f)
    for result in data.get('results', []):
        findings.append({
            'tool': 'semgrep',
            'rule': result.get('check_id'),
            'severity': result.get('extra', {}).get('severity', 'unknown'),
            'file': result.get('path'),
            'line': result.get('start', {}).get('line'),
            'message': result.get('extra', {}).get('message'),
            'cwe': result.get('extra', {}).get('metadata', {}).get('cwe'),
        })
    return findings

def load_bandit(path):
    """Parse Bandit JSON output."""
    findings = []
    with open(path) as f:
        data = json.load(f)
    for result in data.get('results', []):
        findings.append({
            'tool': 'bandit',
            'rule': result.get('test_id'),
            'severity': result.get('issue_severity'),
            'file': result.get('filename'),
            'line': result.get('line_number'),
            'message': result.get('issue_text'),
            'cwe': result.get('issue_cwe', {}).get('id'),
        })
    return findings

def deduplicate(findings):
    """Deduplicate findings across tools."""
    seen = set()
    unique = []
    for f in findings:
        key = (f['file'], f['line'], f.get('cwe'))
        if key not in seen:
            seen.add(key)
            unique.append(f)
    return unique

def aggregate_results(results_dir):
    """Aggregate all SAST results."""
    findings = []

    semgrep_path = Path(results_dir) / 'semgrep.json'
    if semgrep_path.exists():
        findings.extend(load_semgrep(semgrep_path))

    bandit_path = Path(results_dir) / 'bandit.json'
    if bandit_path.exists():
        findings.extend(load_bandit(bandit_path))

    # Deduplicate and sort by severity
    findings = deduplicate(findings)
    severity_order = {'ERROR': 0, 'HIGH': 0, 'WARNING': 1, 'MEDIUM': 1, 'INFO': 2, 'LOW': 2}
    findings.sort(key=lambda x: severity_order.get(x['severity'].upper(), 3))

    return findings

name: SAST Scanning
on:
  push:
    branches: [main, develop]
  pull_request:
    branches: [main]

jobs:
  sast:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Run Semgrep
        uses: returntocorp/semgrep-action@v1
        with:
          config: >-
            p/security-audit
            p/secrets
            p/owasp-top-ten

      - name: Run CodeQL
        uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v3
        with:
          languages: python, javascript

      - name: Run Bandit
        run: |
          pip install bandit
          bandit -r . -f sarif -o bandit.sarif || true

      - name: Upload SARIF results
        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
        with:
          sarif_file: bandit.sarif

sast:
  stage: test
  image: python:3.11
  before_script:
    - pip install semgrep bandit
  script:
    - semgrep --config=auto . --sarif -o semgrep.sarif || true
    - bandit -r . -f sarif -o bandit.sarif || true
  artifacts:
    reports:
      sast:
        - semgrep.sarif
        - bandit.sarif
    when: always

# Language-specific jobs
semgrep:
  stage: test
  image: returntocorp/semgrep
  script:
    - semgrep ci
  variables:
    SEMGREP_RULES: "p/security-audit p/secrets"

# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
  - repo: https://github.com/returntocorp/semgrep
    rev: v1.52.0
    hooks:
      - id: semgrep
        args: ['--config', 'p/secrets', '--error']

  - repo: https://github.com/PyCQA/bandit
    rev: 1.7.7
    hooks:
      - id: bandit
        args: ['-ll', '-ii']
        exclude: tests/

  - repo: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks
    rev: v8.18.1
    hooks:
      - id: gitleaks

# Semgrep rules for common injections
rules:
  - id: sql-injection-python
    patterns:
      - pattern-either:
          - pattern: cursor.execute("..." + $VAR + "...")
          - pattern: cursor.execute(f"...{$VAR}...")
          - pattern: cursor.execute("...%s..." % $VAR)
          - pattern: cursor.execute("...{}...".format($VAR))
    message: Potential SQL injection
    languages: [python]
    severity: ERROR

  - id: command-injection-python
    patterns:
      - pattern-either:
          - pattern: os.system($CMD)
          - pattern: subprocess.call($CMD, shell=True, ...)
          - pattern: subprocess.run($CMD, shell=True, ...)
    message: Potential command injection
    languages: [python]
    severity: ERROR

  - id: xpath-injection
    patterns:
      - pattern: |
          $TREE.xpath("..." + $INPUT + "...")
    message: Potential XPath injection
    languages: [python]
    severity: ERROR

rules:
  - id: missing-auth-decorator
    patterns:
      - pattern: |
          @app.route(...)
          def $FUNC(...):
              ...
      - pattern-not: |
          @login_required
          @app.route(...)
          def $FUNC(...):
              ...
      - pattern-not: |
          @auth.required
          @app.route(...)
          def $FUNC(...):
              ...
    paths:
      exclude:
        - "**/public/**"
        - "**/health/**"
    message: Route may be missing authentication
    languages: [python]
    severity: WARNING

  - id: jwt-weak-secret
    patterns:
      - pattern: jwt.encode(..., $SECRET, ...)
      - metavariable-regex:
          metavariable: $SECRET
          regex: '".{1,20}"'
    message: JWT secret appears to be weak
    languages: [python]
    severity: WARNING

rules:
  - id: weak-hash-algorithm
    patterns:
      - pattern-either:
          - pattern: hashlib.md5(...)
          - pattern: hashlib.sha1(...)
    message: Weak hash algorithm - use SHA-256 or better
    languages: [python]
    severity: WARNING

  - id: weak-cipher
    patterns:
      - pattern-either:
          - pattern: DES.new(...)
          - pattern: ARC4.new(...)
          - pattern: Blowfish.new(...)
    message: Weak cipher algorithm
    languages: [python]
    severity: ERROR

  - id: hardcoded-iv
    patterns:
      - pattern: AES.new(..., iv=$IV, ...)
      - metavariable-regex:
          metavariable: $IV
          regex: 'b".*"'
    message: Hardcoded IV detected - use random IV
    languages: [python]
    severity: ERROR

# SAST Scan Report

## Executive Summary
- Scan Date: YYYY-MM-DD
- Repository: [name]
- Commit: [hash]
- Tools Used: Semgrep, CodeQL, Bandit
- Total Findings: X (Critical: Y, High: Z)

## Critical Findings

### [CRITICAL] SQL Injection in user_service.py
- **Location**: src/services/user_service.py:42
- **Tool**: Semgrep (sql-injection-format-string)
- **CWE**: CWE-89
- **Code**:
  ```python
  query = f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = {user_id}"
  cursor.execute(query)

---

## Bundled Resources

### scripts/
- `sast_scan.sh` - Multi-tool orchestration script
- `aggregate_results.py` - Result aggregation and deduplication
- `sarif_to_csv.py` - SARIF to CSV converter

### references/
- `semgrep_rules.md` - Custom Semgrep rule reference
- `cwe_mapping.md` - CWE to tool rule mapping
- `false_positive_patterns.md` - Known FP patterns by tool

### checklists/
- `triage_checklist.md` - Finding triage checklist
- `ci_integration_checklist.md` - CI/CD setup checklist